mining which items of damages are recoverable under which theory. 9 In particular, economic losses -e.g., damages for inadequate value, costs of repair, and replacement of defective goods, or for consequent loss of profits 10 -generally cannot be recovered in a tort action. 11 These losses represent the buyer's contractual expectation interest, and the buyer's remedy, if any, must be based on the product's warranty. 12 Tort and contract principles come into conflict when the product itself is damaged or destroyed as the result of its own defect. 13 The product is the buyer's property, and damages for physical harm to property are recoverable in tort. 14 However, the value of the product itself is the central element in the parties' bargain. As part of that bargain, the parties may have allocated the risks of a defect. The premises of contract law are abandoned if a buyer may evade contractual language excluding or limiting warranty liability simply by suing the seller in tort.1s
This Note argues that if a seller and a commercial buyer are in privity, damage to a product resulting from its own defect should not be recoverable by a commercial buyer in a tort action. Part I shows 9. See, e.g., Rudd Constr. Equip. Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 735 F.2d 974, 983 (6th Cir. 1984 REv. 963, 963 n.2 (1978) .
11. The leading case espousing this view is Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) Co., 391 F. Supp. 962 (D. Ariz. 1975 ), affd., 541 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1976 ), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977 ; Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978) ; National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983) ; Mid Continent Aircraft v. Curry County Spraying Serv., 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978) .
13. See Wade, supra note 3, at 26 n.87. 14. See note 2 supra; see also Industrial Uniform Rental Co. v. International Harvester Co., 317 Pa. Super. 65, 80, 463 A.2d 1085 , 1093 (1983 (Hester, J., dissenting); Air Prods. & Chems. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 217-19, 206 N.W.2d 414, 426-28 (1973) . 15. Rudd Constr. Equip. Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 735 F.2d 974, 984 (6th Cir. 1984 ) ("[W]e do not believe that a sophisticated, commercial buyer ... can evade contractual language excluding liability for consequential or special damages simply by suing the seller in tort."); see also Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741F.2d1569, 1582 (10th Cir. 1984 ) ("The extension of products liability to these types of losses would make the manufacturer the guarantor that its prod· ucts would continue to perform satisfactory [sic] throughout their productive lives. This is plainly against the purpose of either current manufacturer's products liability or contract law."); Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud Tractor, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 208, 214 (E.D. Wis. 1984 ) ("To allow tort remedies to overlay this commercial framework ... would undermine certainty and predictability in business relationships .... ").
how the conflict arises and examines the judicial boundaries that are normally drawn between tort and warranty liability. Part II contrasts the rationales for the warranty and tort remedies, with particular emphasis on the Uniform Commercial Code and Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Part III argues that if a seller and a commercial buyer are in privity and the only damage is to the defective product itself, the rationales supporting strict tort liability are inapplicable. The Note concludes that commercial buyers seeking to recover the value of a product that has been damaged as a result of its own defect should be limited to the remedies provided by the Uniform Commercial Code in a suit against their immediate sellers.
I. PHYSICAL DAMAGE AND THE ECONOMIC-Loss RULE
The buyer of a defective product can always seek a remedy under the Uniform Commercial Code. If some provision of the Code bars or limits recovery, 16 the buyer may seek to circumvent the troublesome Code provision by suing under the strict tort liability theory. Ordinarily, if there is physical damage to persons or property, the policies underlying strict tort liability are sufficiently strong to permit recourse to tort law as an alternate theory of recovery. 17 However, if the only damage caused by the defective product is to the product itself-that is, if the physical damage is self-inflicted -the policies supporting an action based on strict tort liability are far less compelling.
The facts in Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 18 illustrate the conflict between the Uniform Commercial Code warranty provisions and strict tort liability. Pennsylvania Glass Sand (PGS) bought a front-end loader from Caterpillar in 1971. The express warranty accompanying the loader limited the purchaser's remedy to replacement of defective parts and specifically excluded recovery for economic loss. 19 For approximately four years, PGS used the loader daily at its quarry in Mapleton, Pennsylvania. In September 1975 a fire broke out near the loader's hydraulic lines. The operator escaped injury, but neglected to turn the machine off. As a result, hydraulic fluid continued to fuel the fire, causing severe damage to the loader.
In June 1979 PGS filed suit seeking as damages the amount spent on repairing the loader and securing a temporary replacement. Liability for these damages was specifically excluded by Caterpillar's war-16. See notes 55.59 infra and accompanying text.
17. E.g., Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893, 897 (S.D. Ind. 1984 ) (noting in dicta: "Imposing tort liability on a manufacturer ... is justified when a product causes personal injury or even when it causes damage to itself or other property under circumstances in which the absence of personal injury is merely fortuitous .... "), affd., 771F.2d1081 (7th Cir. 1985 .
18. 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying Pennsylvania law). 19. 652 F.2d at 1167.
[ Vol. 84:517 ranty. Moreover, as the court noted, by the time suit was filed, a warranty claim was probably barred by the Code's statute of limitations. 20 Nevertheless, by advancing theories of negligence and strict tort liability, PGS was able to proceed to tria1.21 Because of the existence of both tort and contract remedies for personal injuries and property damage, courts face a "seamless web running from express warranty through the implied warranty of merchantability to strict tort liability." 22 The tort theory offers an important advantage to buyers because, in a tort action, the various Code defenses 23 are not available to the seller. Since the issue of liability and the amount of recovery may depend on which theory is successful, courts entertaining both theories in a single suit have been forced to define the contours of the developing tort remedy. 2 4 It is generally accepted that economic losses, 25 at least when unaccompanied by any physical damage, 26 are not recoverable in an action based on strict tort liability. 27 The rationale for this rule is that the buyer's economic interests are adequately protected by the Code, 28 and subjecting a seller to strict liability for exclusively economic losses would displace the legislatively enacted Code framework. 29 Moreover, imposing tort liability would result in "the consuming public [paying] more for their products so that a manufacturer can insure against the possibility that some of his products will not meet the business needs of some of his customers." 30
In many situations, the economic-loss rule can be applied without See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) . But see, e.g., Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) .
28. See, e.g., Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 336, 581 P.2d 784, 794 (1978) . 29. E.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 91, 435 N.E.2d 443, 453 (1982) (commercial buyer limited to U.C.C. remedies for cracks developing in a defective silo).
30. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 eat: 2d 9, 19, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965) .
The mechanism by which a seller can pass these insurance costs on to a buyer is considerably more complicated than first appears. Apparently the benchmark cost of insuring against products liability now stands at about one percent of sales, although there are, of course, major variations among industries. See Schwartz, New Products. Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactfre Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 796, 812 & n.114 (1983) ; see also INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, FINAL REPORT (1978) . The one percent figure does not reflect the cumulative effect of the cost of products liability insurance as the product difficulty. It is reasonably clear that the "operation of a defective radiator causes property damage when it results in a fire which destroys the plaintiff's store and economic harm when it results in conditions so uncomfortable that it causes the loss of customer patronage." 31 Damages to the store could be recovered in a tort suit, while damages for lost profits would be recoverable, if at all, in contract. 32 But if a product is damaged as a result of its own defects -if, for example, the radiator becomes clogged because of a defective valve -the property damage is coextensive with the economic loss. In such cases, the economic-loss rule's "type of harm" criterion provides no guidance on whether a tort remedy should be available.
Courts have taken four different approaches to determining whether a tort recovery is available for a product's self-inflicted damages. Two of those approaches simply read the economic-loss rule as if it did provide guidance. The fact that economic loss is coincident with physical damage does not make it any the less economic loss, and one approach is to deny recovery for a defective product's self-inflicted damage for that reason. 33 A second approach reaches the opposite conclusion by essentially the same logic: the fact that a defective product's self-inflicted damage is coincident with economic loss does not make it any the less physical damage, or any the less recoverable in a tort action. 34 Clearly, neither of these approaches provides a principasses through the chain of distribution, nor does it reflect indirect costs borne by the insured, such as claims handling and deductibles. Id. at VI-23 to VI-24.
Depending on a firm's profit margin, it may or may not be able to absorb the cost of insuring against products liability, see id. at VI-12 to VI-13, and, depending on the elasticity of demand for a firm's products, it may or may not be able to pass these costs on to its buyers. But cf. H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 63-64 (1978) (In a competitive market, whether a tax is levied on a producer or a consumer makes no difference in the short run; in the long run, the price to the consumer will have to rise by exactly the amount of the tax.). 31. Note, Economic Loss, supra note 3, at 918. 32. But see, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974 Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 91-93, 326 N.E.2d 267, 269-71 (1975) (allowing homeowner to maintain an action in tort for damage to concrete driveway due to defective materials and workmanship); City of La Crosse v. Schubert, 72 Wis. 2d 38, 44-45, 240 N.W.2d 124, 127 (1976) [Vol. 84:517 pled basis for allowing or disallowing recovery for self-inflicted damages. Not surprisingly, a majority of courts have turned to a third approach, based upon the landmark decision of Seely v. White Motor Co. 35 The Seely court reasoned that a requirement for the imposition of strict tort liability is the existence of an unreasonably dangerous defect, so that only contractual remedies should be available for ordinary qualitative defects. 36 Thus, when the damage to the defective product results from deterioration or some other gradual, nonaccidental cause, it is characterized as economic loss, and any remedies must be found in the Code. 37 When a product defect causes the product to sustain physical harm in a violent or sudden manner, the damage is characterized as property damage, and the manufacturer also will be liable in tort. 38 The rationale is that when a product defect creates a risk of personal injury, liability should not depend upon the fortuity of whether or not personal injuries actually occurred. 3 9 (permitting tort recovery from manufacturer of defective roofing materials for loss of value of roof and, in dicta, also for consequential economic damages). In Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985) , the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the Santor holding did not extend to commercial buyers. The plaintiff, a distributor in the business of selling and leasing trucks, was thus limited to its Code remedies.
35. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) . 36. [The manufacturer] can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonabfe risks of harm .... [The consumer] can ... be fairly charged with the risk that the product will not match his economic expectations unless the manufacturer agrees that it will. 63 Cal. 2d at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23. In Seely, the plaintiff bought a truck from the defendant, White Motor Company. Upon taking possession of the truck, the buyer found that it bounced violently, a condition known as "galloping." The seller's representatives made many unsuccessful efforts to correct the problem. Later, faulty brakes caused the buyer's truck to overturn, resulting in damage to the truck but no personal injuries. The buyer sued the seller for (1) accident-related damages for the repair of the truck, and (2) damages, unrelated to the accident, for the money paid on the purchase price and for the profits lost in his business because he was unable to make normal use of the truck. The California Supreme Court affirmed a judgment awarding the plaintiff the second category of damages based on breach of warranty, but denying the plaintiff's strict tort liability claim for the accident-related damages.
37. See Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1977) (disallowing action based on strict tort liability against a mobile home manufacturer to recover damages for defects such as a faulty furnace, doors that would not close, cracked windows, a malfunctioning electrical system, a leaky bathtub, and a leaky roof, because the defects resulted only in economic losses).
38. See Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977) (allowing action based on strict tort liability against a mobile home manufacturer for damages to the mobile home resulting from a fire caused by the product's own defect).
39. See Largoza v. General Elec. Co., 538 F. Supp. 1164 , 1169 (E.D. Pa. 1982 ) ("It would surely be anomalous if manufacturers were allowed to evade their responsibility to market safe products merely because of the fortuitous circumstances that loss of life did not result on a particular occasion."); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 22 n.2, 403 P.2d 145, 154 n.2, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 26 n.2 (1965) (Peters, J., concurring) ("I cannot rationally hold that the plaintiff whose vehicle is destroyed in an accident caused by a defective part may recover his property damage under a given theory while another plaintiff who is astute or lucky enough to discover the defect and thereby avoid such an accident cannot recover for other damages proximately December 1985] Note -Tort Recovery for The Seely approach provides a principled basis for delineating the limits of the economic-loss rule by refining the "type of harm" concept. In practice, however, this means that courts must make their own assessments of the sort of risks that may have been posed by particular defects. Moreover, the Seely approach allows contractual arrangements to be upset depending on how suddenly an economic loss is incurred. 40 A fourth approach obviates both speculation and fortuity by returning to a fundamental distinction: Contract law, unlike tort law, is predicated on a bargain between two parties. 41 If the risk which in fact materialized was the subject of contractual risk allocation,42 using tort law to shift losses subverts the rationale for the economic-loss rule. Under this approach, the key factor is whether the buyer and seller were in privity, 43 and thus in a position to allocate the risks of self-inflicted damage to defective products. 44 If they were, tort caused by an identical defective part. The strict liability should apply to both plaintiffs or to neither. They cannot be validly distinguished."); Comment, The Vexing Problem of the Purely Economic Loss in Products Liability: An Injury in Search of a Remedy, 4 SETON HALL L. REv. 145, 154 (1972) ; cf Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 , 1173 (3d Cir. 1981 ("[T] he line between tort and contract must be drawn by analyzing interrelated factors such as the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the manner in which the injury arose.").
40. See Consumers Power Co. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 780 F.2d 1093, 1102 (3d Cir. 1986) (Weis, J., dissenting):
[E]conomic loss, including damage to the product itself, is a matter for negotiation and allocation of risk between the parties. The fortuity that personal injury or outside property damage might occur in addition to injury to the defective product does not require a different rule with respect to economic loss. 41. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 26, 403 P.2d 145, 156, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 28 (1965) (Peters, J., concurring) ("How can the nature of the damages which occur later, long after the transaction has been completed, control the characterization of the transaction? Any line which determines whether damages should be covered by warranty law or the strict liability doctrine should be drawn at the time the sale is made.") (emphasis in original).
42. In Consumers Power Co. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 780 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1986 ), the court upheld a tort recovery for the value of an engine that exploded due to a faulty replacement part, in part because "no limitation of liability had been agreed to by the partie5. They did not shift the economic risk of an accident by agreement from what the parties could expect under ordinary tort principles." 780 F.2d at 1099. That the parties are entitled to limit liability by mutual agreement, however, demonstrates that their relationship is essentially contractual. It cannot be that the question of whether the U.C.C. applies, to the exclusion of strict tort liability, depends upon whether the parties have agreed to an express limitation of liability. Cf note 44 infra.
43. Originally, lack of privity was grounds for dismissing a tort claim. See note 66 infra. This new approach thus stands the old privity limitation on its head, by requiring dismissal of tort claims if the parties are in privity.
44. Whether genuine bargaining can occur also depends, of course, on the relative strength of the parties. Some courts have held strict tort liability inapplicable between parties who "(1) deal in a commercial setting; (2) from positions of relatively equal economic strength; (3) bargain the specifications of the product; and (4) negotiate concerning the risk of loss from defects in it." Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 737, 748, 127 Cal. Rptr. 838, 845 (1976) ; see also Purvis v. Consolidated Energy Prods. Co., 674 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1982) ; Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1979 ). This Note argues that, although the consumer/commercial buyer distinction is problematic, see note 144 infra, the privity approach is properly limited to disputes involving commercial buyers.
Demanding evidence of actual negotiation about loss due to product defects -rather than 524
Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:517 remedies are unavailable, regardless of the way the damage occurred. 45 The economic-loss rule does not itself provide an answer to the problem of a product's self-inflicted damage. The inconsistent results it has yielded in federal court diversity cases, where a buyer's recovery may depend on complicated choice-of-law questions and tenuous predictions of state law, highlight the need for a workable and uniform rule. 46 In cases involving commercial buyers, such a rule can be developed from an analysis of the different policies underlying strict tort liability and the Uniform Commercial Code.
II. WARRANTY AND STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARALLEL THEORIES OF RECOVERY
The justifications for strict liability in tort are distinct from the policies underlying the Uniform Commercial Code. The Code relies on market processes to reach a socially desirable outcome. It defers to the intentions of the parties because it presumes that they have adequate information and sufficient bargaining power to reach an agreement that advances the interests of the buyer, the seller, and society at large. In contrast, strict liability in tort contemplates a failure of market processes. Losses are allocated by rule of law because transaction costs, information costs, or external costs prevent the parties from reaching a socially desirable outcome.
simply the ability to bargain -is question-begging, for the issue is whether a nonconsensual tort remedy should be imposed upon the parties. See notes 88-93 infra and accompanying text. If both parties have effective bargaining power, and do not use it to negotiate about risk ofloss, they have chosen to avail themselves of the law that will apply in default of a contractual provision. What that law is should not vary depending on whether negotiation occurred.
45. E.g., Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud Tractors, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (denying negligence and strict tort liability claims against manufacturer of allegedly defective transmissions where plaintiff tractor manufacturer was not a consumer or ultimate user, and the parties were in privity); General Pub. Utils. Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 547 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1982 ) (plaintiffs, owners and operators of Three Mile Island nuclear generating facility denied strict tort liability claim against manufacturer of allegedly defective nuclear steam supply system where, inter alia, the parties were in contractual privity and were in a position to allocate risk).
46. See Rudd Constr. Equip. Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 735 F.2d 974, 978 (6th Cir. 1984) :
This appeal demonstrates the problems faced in diversity cases when federal courts must predict state Jaw without the security of appellate review by the st;ite's highest court. The problem is particularly acute here, given the dearth of authority in Kentucky law on some of the issues, and the considerable variation in the treatment of like issues by the courts of different states. Courts, 4 7 commentators, 48 and draftsmen 49 have emphasized that the tort and Code remedies, like the theories underlying them, are distinct. Both schemes advance social interests only to the extent that their underlying assumptions are valid. Which damages are available thus depends upon whether the assumptions underlying the Code or those underlying strict tort liability are more likely to hold true when a product is damaged as a result of its own defect.
A. Breach of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code
A buyer's action for breach of warranty is governed generally by the Uniform Commercial Code. Three of the Code's four warranty provisions are relevant to cases involving defective products. so The Code controls express warranties, which are created by the parties as part of their bargain. 51 It also creates an implied warranty of merchantability 52 and, under certain circumstances, an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 53 The Code's damage provisions are broad enough to provide relief for all injuries to person or property caused by a defective product, including damage to the product itself. 54 Nevertheless, a buyer attempting to recover under these Code provisions still faces significant obstacles. First, a seller may limit the remedies available for breach of 47. See, e.g., C & S Fuel, Inc. v. Clark Equip. Co., 524 F. Supp. 949, 952 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (noting that the "elements of a cause of action in tort for property damage loss differ from the elements in contract"); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 15, 403 P.2d 145, 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21 (1965) ("The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was designed, not to undermine the warranty provisions of the ... Uniform Commercial Code but, rather, to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries."). Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under [2-316] an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
54. See Wade, supra note 3, at 2. Although U.C.C. § 2-714(2) states that the measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods as accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, U.C.C. § 2-714 comment 3 (1978) states that § 2-714(2) "describes the usual, standard and reasonable method of ascertaining damages in the case of breach of warranty but it is not intended as an exclusive measure." Section 2-714(3) provides that "[i]n a proper case ... consequential damages may also be recovered." Section 2-715(2) states that "[c]onsequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include ... injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty." Thus, damage to the defective product resulting from its own defect would be an element of consequential damages. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 386-87 &n.54.
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Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:S17 warranty.ss Second, implied warranties may be disclaimed entirely. 56 Third, the buyer must "within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered" a breach of warranty, give notice of the breach "or be barred from any remedy."S 7 Finally, a breach of warranty normally occurs when tender of delivery is made, ss and an action for the breach must be commenced within four years thereafter.s 9 The Uniform Commercial Code, like contract law generally, regulates economic transactions such as buying, selling, leasing, and borrowing. The underlying economic principle is that rational decisionmakers will make exchanges that maximize utility. 60 In the process, resources are allocated to their most valuable uses, thus maximizing the wealth of society as well. 61 Consistent with the goal of facilitating such voluntary exchanges, the underlying policies of the Uniform Commercial Code are to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law of commercial transactions; permit the continued expansion of commercial practices; and encourage uniform commercial laws. If A owns a good that is worth only $100 to him but $150 to B, both will be made better off by an exchange of A's good for B's money at any price between $100 and $1SO; and if they realize this, they will make the exchange. By making both of them better off, the exchange will also increase the wealth of society (of which they are members), assuming the exchange does not reduce the welfare ofnonparties more than it increases A's and B's welfare. Before the exchange-which, let us say, takes place at a price of $125-A had a good worth $100 to him and B had $12S in cash, a total of $22S. After the exchange, A has $12S in cash and B has a good worth $150 to him, a total of $27S. The exchange has increased the wealth of society by $50 (ignoring, as we have done, any possible third-party effects). Stated another way, voluntary exchanges enhance economic efficiency. The classic criterion for economic efficiency is Pareto superiority, a term that describes an exchange that makes at least some people better off without making anyone worse off. Kronman and Posner employ the more modem and less stringent Kaldor-Hicks criterion, under which an exchange is efficient if it is potentially Pareto superior; i.e., the people who are better off co11ld compensate those who are worse off out of their gains. See H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 216 (1978) . Bllt see Freedom of contract is a principle of the Code, 63 and its remedies are designed to put the aggrieved party in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed the agreement. 64
B. Strict Tort Liability: Beyond the Warranty Fiction
The liability of a remote manufacturer in connection with the sale of a defective product began to develop early in the twentieth century. 65 Under the previous rule, ifthe aggrieved buyer was not in privity with the manufacturer, no recovery could be had, not even for negligence. 66 Once the privity limitation was discarded for negligence, however, courts began to carry the manufacturer's responsibility further.67 Liability without negligence and without privity was first established in cases involving unsafe food and drink. 68 Later, this liability was extended to animal food, 69 cosmetics, 70 and other products, 71 eventually resulting in the formulation of the current doctrine of strict liability in tort. 12 Courts relied on a variety oflegal theories to support the extension 72. While strict liability in tort varies from state to state, the most authoritative statement of the doctrine is found in the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, which provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and • (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller. See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 325-26 ("[S]trict tort ... liability is often indistinguishable from liability for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability."); id. at 355: [Vol. 84:517 of strict liability. 73 The existence of an "implied warranty" became the most common ground for decision. 74 The hybrid nature of the action for breach of warranty facilitated the adoption of this device. 75 It soon became clear that basing strict liability on a warranty notion created nearly as many problems as it seemed to solve. The term was so closely identified with contracts in the minds of most courts and lawyers that contract rules were assumed necessarily to apply. 76 This posed a problem if there was no contract. 77 Also, warranties on the sale of goods were governed by the Uniform Sales Act and later, in most states, by the Uniform Commercial Code. These statutes were intended primarily to govern the contractual relations between the seller and an immediate buyer. 78 Notice and disclaimer provisions 7 9 created formidable obstacles to recovery by a remote buyer. Such a buyer is unlikely to have any information about warranty or disclaimer terms. 80 Also, it may not occur to a remote buyer to give notice to a party with whom the buyer has had no dealings. 81 These contractual defenses severely curtailed the usefulness of the strict liability doctrine.
A concluding question ..
• is how the merchantability standard differs from the compa· rable strict tort standard .... The most obvious difference between the two standards is that the strict tort standard is considerably narrower in scope. It does not purport to reach all defective goods but only those that are not only defective but also "unreasonably dangerous," that is those that have the capacity to cause personal injury or property damage as opposed to those which cause only economic loss. Apart from that difference, we would find the terms nearly synonymous .... 75. "A more notable example oflegal miscegenation could hardly be cited than that which produced the modem action for breach of warranty. Originally sounding in tort, yet arising out of the warrantor's consent to be bound, it later ceased necessarily to be consensual, and at the same time came to lie mainly in contract." Representation, 42 HARV. L. REv. 414, 414-15 (1929) 80. In a commercial setting, disclaiiners allow the contracting parties to allocate the risks of a transaction as they wish. Disclaimers comport well with the general Code policy of allowing parties to make their own agreements. See U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 3 (1978) ("Any seller who does not wish to take the risk of consequential damages has available the section on contractual limitation of remedy[ § 2-719]."); U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 3 (" [Disclaimers] are merely an allocation of unknown or undeterminable risks."). However, if a manufacturer has disclaimed or limited warranties as to the first buyer, e.g., a wholesaler, the ultimate user or consumer may be bound by a warranty that he or she has neither seen nor bargained for. See U.C.C. § 2-318 comment 1.
Id. at 1126 (quoting Note, Necessity for Privity of Contract in Warranties by
81. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) requires a party to give notice of a breach. As between immediate parties to a sale this is a sound rule, but as applied to remote parties who have been injured by defective products it becomes a "booby-trap for the unwary." See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (discussing the Uniform Sales Act, predecessor of the U.C.C.).
Courts resorted to a variety of devices to circumvent the notice and disclaimer provisions. 82 This resort to "covert tools" 83 caused considerable consternation among legal commentators. 84 As the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Dean Prosser wrote and urged the adoption of section 402A, which extended strict tort liability from products "intended for intimate bodily use" to "any product." 85 Shortly before the new Restatement was adopted, the California Supreme Court decided Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 86 recognizing, for the first time, a general tort theory of strict liability for. defective products. Courts were quick to seize upon these developments as authority for discarding the warranty fiction and for recognizing a new theory of products liability sounding in tort. 87 82. Courts circumvented notice requirements by holding that a long delay before giving notice was "reasonable," e.g., Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948) If, for example, you proceed along the lines of warranty, then you run into court after court that says, "But a child can't have the remedy." You even run into a court that says, "When a wife buys, she buys as the assumed agent of her husband; therefore she has not got the remedy." You see, it is nuts, just nuts! Wade, supra note 3, at 17-18 (quoting N.C.C.U.S.L., Minutes of the Committee of the Whole 88-
(Sept. 1941) (unpublished typescript)).
Dean Prosser concluded that the use of warranty in these cases was "pernicious and unnecessary," because:
No one doubts that, unless there is privity, liability to the consumer must be in tort and not in contract. There is no need to borrow a concept from the contract law of sales; and it is "only by some violent pounding and twisting" that "warranty" can be made to serve the purpose at all. . . . If there is to be strict liability in tort, let there be strict liability in tort, declared outright, without an illusory contract mask. Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 619-20, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186-87 (1965) ; Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1963) . [Vol. 84:517 Unlike the Uniform Commercial Code, tort law generally regulates forced exchanges of entitlements. 88 Accidents are good examples. If an accidental injury occurs, and the injurer is adjudged liable, the injurer must pay (and the victim must accept) an objectively determined measure of damages. 89 Because subjective values are not taken into account, forced exchanges may not be efficient: both parties may end up worse off than before the accident. 90 In the paradigm case, it is impossible to rely on voluntary exchanges to reach an optimal result because the identities of the victim and the injurer are unknown until the accident occurs. 91
In some cases the identities of potential injurers and potential victims are known. Depending on the circumstances, voluntary exchanges enforced by contract rules may lead to more efficient results. For example, while it seems inconceivable for drivers and pedestrians to bargain over the risk of traffic accidents, it may be feasible for coal miners and mine owners to bargain over wages that reflect the risk of mine accidents. 92 The typical products liability situation presents another instance in which bargaining is feasible, because the potential injurer (the seller) and the potential victim (the buyer) are known.93 When the buyer and the seller actually do bargain over the risk of injury due to a potentially defective product, the argument for applying contract rules is strongest.
Even if the buyer and seller expressly bargain over the risk of defects, the bargain may not be enforced because of overriding social policies. 94 The terms of a bargain may be set aside either because lim- [T]he justification for the strict liability has been said to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility to· ward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consump· tion be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is entitled iting the buyer to contract remedies would be unfair or because there was some defect in the bargaining process that prevented the parties from reaching an efficiency-enhancing result. The fairness rationale is essentially comprised of the following four arguments. First, sellers convey to the public a general sense of product quality in their advertising and marketing practices, causing buyers to rely on them for their skill and expertise. 95 Second, sellers are often in a better position than buyers to identify potential product risks, to determine acceptable levels of such risks, and to confine the risks within those levels. 96 Third, most product accidents not caused by product abuse are probably attributable to the seller's negligence at some stage of the manufacturing or marketing process. 97 Fourth, sellers are almost invariably in a better position to absorb or spread the costs of product accidents.9 8 The efficiency rationale typically is advanced by one of the following arguments. First, buyers are unable to protect themselves because of insufficient information, lack of bargaining power; or lack of choice. 99 Second, the costs of injuries flowing from defective products to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the products. 703-14 (1980) . One court described the development of strict tort liability as a response to the lack of contractual privity between manufacturer and ultimate user ... ; the relatively unequal strengths of buyer and seller at the bargaining table ... ; the difficulty faced by a consumer in proving negligence on the part of the manufacturer where the consumer· is several steps down the distribution chain and the evidence of negligent production is exclusively within the control of the manufacturer ... ; [and] SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 191 n.10 (1982) (bargaining power explanation fails to [Vol. 84:517 can fairly be put on the enterprises marketing those products as a cost of doing business, thus assuring that these businesses will fully "pay their own way" in the society from which they derive their profits. 100 Finally, strict liability is needed to induce sellers to market safe products. 101 The expansion of the judicially developed tort theory has brought it into conflict with the more restrictive warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. While some have argued that the area of products liability was preempted by legislative enactment of the Code, this view has not prevailed. 102 Thus, in most states there are two potential remedies for the same wrong. In cases such as Pennsylvania Glass Sand v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 103 a commercial buyer in privity with its seller can escape the limitations on its warranty 104 by framing its cause of action in terms of strict tort liability. The following Part assesses whether allowing recourse to tort law under these circumstances can be justified in terms of the rationales for using strict liability to supplant the Code.
See generally

III. CHOOSING A RULE TO ACCOMMODATE THE POLICIES OF TORT LAW AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The tension between the policies of tort law and the Code develops because the function of the product is at the core of the parties' bargain.105 Thus, the harm sustained by the defective product itself represents a loss of the buyer's bargain. This type of harm is specifically account for the great similarity between written sales warranties in consumer and business markets). See Miller Indus. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F.2d 813, 817 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[T] hc performance of the product -whether it explodes or fails to function -is conceptualized as part of the bargain .... "); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 96, 435 addressed by the Uniform Commercial Code. 106 However, if buyers can characterize this harm as "property damage," they can avoid the warranty scheme of the Code -especially the warranty defenses available to the sellers 107 -by suing in tort. 108 There is some question as to whether strict liability remedies ought ever to be available to commercial buyers. Some courts have extended strict liability beyond consumer plaintiffs, 109 even though a commercial buyer is as likely to be able to absorb the loss or to spread it among its customers as the seller. 110 Similarly, commercial buyers and sellers are likely to be equally aware of the risks they are undertaking and to bargain effectively for a contractual remedy. 111 Attempts by commercial buyers to exploit the property damage exception to the economic loss rule accentuate the anomaly of including commercial buyers in the strict tort liability scheme.112 N.E.2d 443, 455 (1982) (Simon, J., specially concurring) ("The product's function is at the core of the commercial bargain .
•.. "). The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act, or those of the Uniform Commercial Code, as to warranties; and it is not affected by limitations on the scope and content of warranties, or by limitations to "buyer'' and "seller" in those statutes. Nor is the consumer required to give notice to the seller of his injury within a reasonable time after it occurs, as is provided by the Uniform Act. The consumer's cause of action does not depend upon the validity of his contract with the person from whom he acquires the product, and it is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it be between the seller and his immediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying the product into the consumer's hands. [Vol. 84:S17 Even assuming, however, that strict liability remedies should sometimes be made available to commercial buyers, 113 the contractual scheme set out in the Uniform Commercial Code is better suited for governing relations between commercial parties who are in privity. Allowing commercial buyers to sue their immediate sellers on a strict tort liability theory effectively overrides the parties' contractual allocation of risk. The tort remedy directly vitiates the effectiveness of section 2-316 of the Code, which allows warranties to be disclaimed, 11 4 and section 2-725 of the Code, which establishes a four-year statute of limitations. 115 More broadly, it impairs the general Code policies of uniformity and certainty in commercial transactions. 116 Leaving commercial buyers to their remedies under the Code by no means assures harsh results, because the Code -which was developed before strict liability emerged -affords a buyer considerable protection. 117 The Code creates implied warranties 118 and requires basically that disclaimers be in writing, conspicuous, and consistent with express warranties. 119 A court can refuse to enforce oppressive warranty terms against a buyer on unconscionability grounds. 120 A court 113. Affording a commercial buyer a cause of action based on strict tort liability against a remote manufacturer may be justifiable if the manufacturer's disclaimer or limitation on warranties is held to be effective against an ultimate purchaser who did not have the opportunity to negotiate over the terms of the agreement. See U.C.C. § § 2-316, 2-719 (1978 Co., 715 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1983) , an action brought by a Utah buyer against a Texas seller and an Illinois clutch manufacturer. Applying Texas law, the court affirmed dismissal of the tort claim against the seller. Applying Illinois law, the court reversed dismissal of the tort claim against the clutch manufacturer. See also Wade, supra note 3, at 27:
The law in one state may adversely affect all three parties to a personal injury casemanufacturer, insurer, and injured party -in other states. The manufacturer's products may be distributed in many states, even nationwide. He must give due consideration to the liability law of all the states where he distributes, and this may affect the nature and cost of his products. The insurance companies are not accustomed to calculating insurance rates according to the actuarial experiences in the individual states. If a state in the northeast or on the west coast develops a rule that is unusually favorable to the injured party, insurance rates and product costs may both rise in other states without any corresponding benefit to the consumer. One of the ironies of the legislative splurge to put restrictions and limitations on liability actions to relieve the products liability crisis was that such an act in a particular case lessened the protection for the local consumer without affording any actual relief to the local manufacturer.
117. See notes 119-22 infra; see also Wade, supra note 97, at 132-36 (contending that a provi· sion similar to § 402A had been dropped from the U.C.C. in favor of § 2-318, which extends sales warranties to certain third parties). Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893, 897 can also grant relief if it finds that circumstances cause an exclusive remedy to "fail of its essential purpose." 121 In addition, the Code imposes a general obligation to deal in good faith. 122 Finally, the Code defenses, such as a failure to give notice of breach, are considerably less onerous for a buyer who has had previous dealings with the seller. 123 At the same time, the policies that justify strict liability have considerably less force when a commercial buyer is suing an immediate seller for the value of the product. When the buyer and seller are in privity, there is no difficulty in identifying the potential victims and the potential injurer. This significantly reduces the transaction costs of allocating the risk of defects by contract. 124 Of course, sellers will sometimes be in a better position than buyers to minimize the risks of product defects. However, informed buyers will at other times have a comparative advantage over sellers in minimizing the risks posed by those defects. 125 The parties and society as a whole will be better off if 121. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1978); see, e.g., Rudd Constr. Equip. Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 735 F.2d 974, 982 (6th Cir. 1984 ) (limited remedy of equipment repair fails of essential purpose where equipment totally destroyed). Ironically, the paradigm "failure of essential purpose" case is one in which a product is damaged beyond repair as the result of its own defects and its warranty is limited to repair or replacement of defective parts. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 465-71. Thus recourse to a strict tort liability claim in this context is critical only to a buyer who must circumvent the Code's statute of limitations, U.C.C. Ind. 1984) (dicta) (reluctance of courts to invoke "good faith" provision does not justify application of tort theory to resolve a sales law problem). Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656, 657 (1975) (if there is no liability without negligence, optimal deterrence will be achieved only if the victim class always can (1) best decide whether accident avoidance is worthwhile; and (2) best accomplish such worthwhile avoidance); Liability, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 , 1060 -61 (1972 (liability should be imposed on the party relatively more likely to find out whether accident avoidance is worth it -the cheapest cost avoider).
[Vol. 84:517 the buyer and seller are allowed to allocate risks consistent with their respective advantages. 126 These potential gains are forgone if a risk allocation is imposed by law.
Thus, the fairness and efficiency rationales for strict liability are not compelling in the commercial context. Because social wealth may increase if the parties are permitted to allocate the risks of product defects by contract, the efficiency rationale 127 is substantially weakened. Because the buyer is protected to a considerable extent by the Code, the fairness rationale 128 is also weakened. Nevertheless, several justifications have been advanced for permitting a commercial buyer to recover for a product's self-inflicted damage in spite of limitations on the seller's liability contained in an express warranty or in the Code.
One common justification for allowing commercial buyers to recover the value of defective products in tort is the need to deter manufacturers from producing unreasonably dangerous products. If manufacturers are held strictly liable for defective products, the argument goes, they will produce safer products. Safe products, the argument continues, should not be something the parties are forced to bargain over; unreasonably dangerous products should simply not be produced. 12 9 Strict tort liability is thus extended to commercial buyers on the social policy grounds of improving safety generally. 130 This justification suffers from a logical difficulty in the strict tort liability context. Once we know a product is "bad," i.e., unreasonably dangerous, it makes sense to deter its manufacturer from producing it. 131 But the deterrence argument contributes nothing to deciding what type and degree of residual danger makes a product "bad" in the first place. It offers no basis for distinguishing an unreasonably dangerous product from one that entails reasonable risks.13 2 This failure of the deterrence justification to distinguish unreasonably dangerous products from those that entail an acceptable level of risk is especially problematic in the commercial context. Imposing strict liability based on a deterrence rationale will tend to discourage the sale of all products that pose any significant danger. 133 When commercial parties with comparable bargaining power and access to information negotiate a warranty concerning a potentially dangerous product, they presumably have made their own judgment about the risks and potential benefits associated with the product, with the buyer concluding that the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs. 134 It is precisely this type of bargain that the Uniform Commercial Code is designed to protect. 135 Strict tort liability effectively overrides the parties' judgment and undermines Code policies.
Further, it is economically inefficient to negate the terms of the parties' bargain unless there is some reason (excluding hindsight) to believe that a court is better equipped to weigh product risks and benefits.136 A general refusal to enforce contract terms leads to more efficient results only if buyers systematically and persistently underestimate product risks. 137 In the commercial context, any errors by the buyer in estimating product risks are likely to be random, and buyers are likely to know the terms of their contracts and the range of market alternatives. Thus, the imposition of strict tort liability in the commercial setting is likely to lead to a less than optimal allocation of risk.
Another common justification for strict tort liability is that manufacturers should always bear the cost of accidents caused by their defective products, either because manufacturers are better able to minimize product defects or better able to spread the cost of injuries among their buyers. 138 In cases involving commercial entities, however, the assumptions on which this rationale is founded may be fundamentally incorrect. As a matter of economic efficiency, allocating the risk of all product defects to sellers by law may prevent the parties from taking advantage of the buyer's superior ability to avoid certain risks. 139 It seems likely that there will be at least some product risks that the buyer, rather than the seller, will be able to avoid more cheaply or insure against more readily. 140 Moreover, substituting a legal allocation of risks for one that may have been bargained for by the parties 141 is at odds with the Code's policy of allowing parties to negotiate their own contracts. 142 Indeed, strict liability creates substantial information demands on the legal system by requiring courts to formulate their own complex risk allocation judgments. 1 43
When a product is damaged as a result of its own defects, commercial buyers 144 in privity with the defendant should be left to the reme-dies provided by the Uniform Commercial Code. Strict tort liability should apply only when the buyer and seller are not in privity. The privity limitation makes sense when only the defective product itself is damaged, because in these situations the affected parties have allocated the risk of product defects by contract. Such bargaining between rational decisionmakers will tend to produce efficient results. 145 When there is some reason to suspect that the bargaining process has been unfair or has led to inefficient results, Code provisions are available to grant relief on a case-by-case basis. 14 6
The privity limitation is consistent with the policies underlying strict liability when a product is damaged because it does not preclude a tort recovery by third parties who would otherwise be forced to bear the external costs of the transaction. The privity limitation is consistent with Code policy in this context because it promotes certainty and stability in commercial transactions. Finally, the privity limitation is a common law doctrine that can be applied far more easily than can rules requiring judicial appraisal of the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the manner in which the injury arose.1 4 1 CONCLUSION When a commercial buyer is in privity with its seller, recovery for the value of a defective product should be controlled by the Uniform Commercial Code. If the damage is to the product itself and the parties have allocated the risk of defects contractually, allowing a strict liability action unfairly allows commercial buyers to escape the consequences of their bargain. 148 Even in the absence of bargaining over risks, strict liability is economically inefficient because it introduces an element of uncertainty into commercial transactions, thereby increasing transaction costs and creating incentives to overinvest in safety. Strict liability frustrates Code policies by interfering with the ability of parties to allocate resources between them as they see fit. Finally, it is his business. Plaintiff was an owner-driver of a single truck he used for hauling and not a fleet-owner who bought trucks regularly in the course of his business. He was the final link in the marketing chain, having no more bargaining power than does the usual individual who purchases a motor vehicle on the retail level.
I recognize that this "ordinary consumer" test needs judicial definition. This should be done on a case-by-case basis as is customarily done with any new doctrine. It is, however, the best resolution of the dilemma facing this court. Although the distinction is currently unstable, the "commercial buyer" limitation should normaUy have little effect on results, for ordinary consumers are unlikely to be in privity with manufacturers. 
